Common Knowledge in a Logic of Gossips by Apt, Krzysztof R. & Wojtczak, Dominik
J. Lang (Ed.): TARK 2017
EPTCS 251, 2017, pp. 10–27, doi:10.4204/EPTCS.251.2
c© K. R. Apt & D. Wojtczak
This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution License.
Common Knowledge in a Logic of Gossips
Krzysztof R. Apt
Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
University of Warsaw
Warsaw, Poland
k.r.apt@cwi.nl
Dominik Wojtczak
University of Liverpool
Liverpool, UK
d.wojtczak@liv.ac.uk
Gossip protocols aim at arriving, by means of point-to-point or group communications, at a situation
in which all the agents know each other secrets. Recently a number of authors studied distributed
epistemic gossip protocols. These protocols use as guards formulas from a simple epistemic logic,
which makes their analysis and verification substantially easier.
We study here common knowledge in the context of such a logic. First, we analyze when it can be
reduced to iterated knowledge. Then we show that the semantics and truth for formulaswithout nested
common knowledge operator are decidable. This implies that implementability, partial correctness
and termination of distributed epistemic gossip protocols that use non-nested common knowledge
operator is decidable, as well. Given that common knowledge is equivalent to an infinite conjunction
of nested knowledge, these results are non-trivial generalizations of the corresponding decidability
results for the original epistemic logic, established in [2].
1 Introduction
Common knowledge is a fundamental notion in epistemic reasoning. It has its origins in the book of
the philosopher David Lewis, [19], and the article of the sociologist Morris Friedell, [15]. By now this
concept was applied in many other fields, including artificial intelligence, psychology, computer science,
game theory, and logic. An early work on this subject in computer science and logic is discussed in [14].
For more recent accounts and surveys see e.g., [11] and [20].
Study and use of various logics equipped with the common knowledge operator is a rich field. As
example of recent publications let us just mention [7], where an update logic augmented with common
knowledge is investigated, and [21], where the correctness of epistemic protocols that rely on common
knowledge is studied.
The purpose of this article is to investigate common knowledge in the context of a simple epistemic
logic proposed in [1] to express and analyze distributed epistemic gossip protocols. Gossip protocols
aim at arriving, by means of point-to-point or group communications, at a situation in which all the
agents know each other secrets, see, e.g., the early survey [16] or the book coverage [18]. Distributed
epistemic gossip protocols were introduced in [6], and further studied in [5, 17, 1, 12, 9, 10, 8], where in
particular various distributed gossiping protocols, their types, epistemic aspects and objectives, and their
interpretation as planning problems were analyzed. Such protocols are strikingly simple in their syntax
based on epistemic logic (though not semantics), which makes it easier to reason about them.
In [2] we showed that the distributed epistemic gossip protocols introduced in [1] are implementable
and proved that the problems of partial correctness and termination of such protocols are decidable, as
well. In [3] we built upon these results and showed that the implementability of a distributed epistemic
gossip protocol is a PNP‖ -complete problem, while the problems of its partial correctness and termina-
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tion are in coNPNP. We also established in [4] that fair termination of the distributed epistemic gossip
protocols is decidable, as well.
In this paper we extend the results of [2] to the language that includes the common knowledge
operator. Given that common knowledge is equivalent to an infinite conjunction of nested knowledge,
these results are non-trivial generalizations of the previous results.
The obtained results clarify when and how common knowledge can arise in the context of gossiping.
We prove that three or more agents can have common knowledge only of true statements. This is not the
case for two agents, even if they do not communicate. We also show that under some assumptions com-
mon knowledge of two agents coincides with the 4th fold iterated knowledge. The main open problem is
whether in this context common knowledge can always be reduced to iterated knowledge.
2 Syntax
The purpose of this paper is to analyze common knowledge in the context of gossip protocols. To describe
it we use a simple modal language introduced in [1], though we allow now the common knowledge
operator instead of the agent related knowledge operator.
Throughout the paper we assume a fixed finite set A of at least three agents. We assume that each
agent holds exactly one secret and that there exists a bijection between the set of agents and the set of
secrets. We denote by P the set of all secrets.
Assume a fixed ordering on the agents. Each call concerns two different agents, say a and b, and is
written as ab or (a,b), where agent a precedes agent b in the assumed ordering.
Calls are denoted by c, d. Abusing notation we write a ∈ c to denote that agent a is one of the two
agents involved in the call c (e.g., for c := ab we have a ∈ c and b ∈ c).
We consider formulas in an epistemic language Lck defined by the following grammar:
φ ::= Fap | ¬φ | φ ∧φ |CGφ ,
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A and G⊆A. Each secret is viewed a distinct constant. We denote the secret of
agent a by A, the secret of agent b by B, where a,b ∈ A and A,B ∈ P, and so on. When G is a singleton,
say G = {a}, then we write CG as Ka, which is the knowledge operator used and studied in the context
of this logic in [1] and [2].
We read Fap as ‘agent a is familiar with the secret p’, Kaφ as ‘agent a knows that formula φ is true’,
and CGφ as ‘the group of agents G commonly knows that formula φ is true’.
So Fap is an atomic formula, while Kaφ and CGφ are compound formulas. In what follows we shall
distinguish the following sublanguages of Lck:
• Lpr, its propositional part, which consists of the formulas that do not use theCG modalities,
• Lwn, which consists of the formulas without the nested use of the CG modalities.
3 Semantics
We now recall from [1] semantics of the epistemic formulas. To this end we recall first the concept of a
gossip situation.
A gossip situation (in short a situation) is a sequence s = (Qa)a∈A, where Qa⊆P for each agent a.
Intuitively, Qa is the set of secrets a is familiar with in situation s. The initial gossip situation is the one
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in which each Qa equals {A} and is denoted by root. We say that an agent a is an expert in a situation s
if he is familiar in s with all the secrets.
Below sets of secrets will be written down as lists. E.g., the set {A,B,C} will be written as ABC.
Gossip situations will be written down as lists of lists of secrets separated by dots. E.g., if there are three
agents, then the gossip situation ({A,B},{A,B},{C}) will be written as AB.AB.C.
Each call transforms the current gossip situation by modifying the set of secrets the agents involved
in the call are familiar with. Consider a gossip situation s := (Qd)d∈A. Then ab(s) := (Q
′
d)d∈A, where
Q′a =Q
′
b =Qa∪Qb,Q
′
c =Qc, for c 6= a,b. This simply says that the only effect of a call is that the secrets
are shared between the two agents involved in it.
In [1] computations of the gossip protocols were studied, so both finite and infinite call sequences
were used. Here we focus on the finite call sequences as we are only interested in the semantics of
epistemic formulas. So to be brief, unless explicitly stated, a call sequence is assumed to be finite.
The empty sequence is denoted by ε . We use c to denote a call sequence and C to denote the set of all
finite call sequences. Given call sequences c and d and a call c we denote by c.c the outcome of adding c
at the end of the sequence c and by c.d the outcome of appending the sequences c and d. We write c⊑ d
to denote the fact that d extends c, i.e., that for some c′ we have c.c′ = d.
The result of applying a call sequence to a situation s is defined inductively as follows:
ε(s) := s,
(c.c)(s) := c(c(s)).
A gossip situation is a set of possible combinations of secret distributions among the agents. As calls
progress in sequence from the initial situation, agents may be uncertain about which one of such secrets
distributions is the actual one. This uncertainty is captured by appropriate equivalence relations on the
call sequences.
Definition 1 A gossip model is a tuple M := (C,{∼a}a∈A), where each ∼a⊆ C×C is the smallest
relation such that ε ∼a ε and the following conditions hold. Suppose c∼a d.
(i) If a 6∈ c, then c.c∼a d and c∼a d.c.
(ii) If a ∈ c and c.c(root)a = d.c(root)a, then c.c∼a d.c.
A gossip model with a designated call sequence is called a pointed gossip model.
So for each set of agents there is exactly one gossip model. To illustrate the definition of ∼a note for
instance that by (i) we have ab,bc∼a ab,bd. But we do not have bc,ab∼a bd,ab since (bc,ab)(root)a =
ABC 6= ABD= (bd,ab)(root)a.
To define semantics of the CG operator we use the relation ∼G⊆ C×C defined by
∼G= (∪a∈G ∼a)
∗
,
where ∗ stands for the transitive reflexive closure of a binary relation. As stated in [1], each ∼a is an
equivalence relation. As a result each ∼G is an equivalence relation, as well.
Finally, we recall the definition of truth.
Definition 2 Let (M,c) be a pointed gossip model with M := (C,(∼a)a∈A) and c ∈ C. We define the
satisfaction relation |= inductively as follows. For convenience we also include the special case of Ka
(i.e., G{a}). The clauses for Boolean connectives are as usual and omitted.
(M,c) |= Fap iff p ∈ c(root)a,
(M,c) |= Kaφ iff ∀d s.t. c∼a d, (M,d) |= φ ,
(M,c) |=CGφ iff ∀d s.t. c∼G d, (M,d) |= φ .
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Further
M|= φ iff ∀c (M,c) |= φ .
WhenM |= φ we say that φ is true. ✷
So a formula Fap is true whenever secret p belongs to the set of secrets agent a is familiar with in the
situation generated by the designated call sequence c applied to the initial situation root. The knowledge
operator Ka is interpreted as customary in epistemic logic, using the equivalence relations ∼a, and the
CG operator is defined as in [14].
While Lck is a pretty standard epistemic language, its semantics is not. Indeed, it describes the truth
of formulas after a sequence of calls took place, by analyzing the statements of the form (M,c) |= φ . So
we actually study here a limited version of a dynamic epistemic logic. To put it differently, we actually
consider statements of the form [c]φ , where [. . .] is the standard dynamic logic operator, see, e.g., [13].
This explains why the study of the logic Lck cannot be reduced to a study of a routine epistemic logic.
4 An alternative equivalence relation
To reason about the∼a and∼G relations it is easier to use an alternative equivalence relation between the
call sequences that was introduced in [2]. It is based on a concept of a view of agent a of a call sequence
c, written as ca, and defined by induction as follows.
[Base]
εa := root,
[Step]
(c.c)a :=
{
ca
c
−→ s if a ∈ c
ca otherwise,
where the gossip situation s is defined by putting for d ∈ A
sd :=
{
c.c(root)d if d ∈ c
s′d otherwise,
where s′ is the last gossip situation in ca.
Intuitively, a view of agent a of a call sequence c is the information he acquires by means of the calls
in c he is involved in. It consists of a sequence of gossip situations connected by the calls in which a is
involved in. After each such call, say ab, agent a updates the set of gossips he and b are currently familiar
with.
Example 3 Let A = {a,b,c} and consider the call sequence (ac,bc,ac). It generates the following suc-
cessive gossip situations starting from root:
A.B.C
ac
−→ AC.B.AC
bc
−→ AC.ABC.ABC
ac
−→ ABC.ABC.ABC.
We now compare it with the view of agent a of the sequence (ac,bc,ac), which is
A.B.C
ac
−→ AC.B.AC
ac
−→ ABC.B.ABC.
Thus, in the final gossip situation of this view, agent b is familiar with neither the secret A nor C. ✷
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We now introduce for each agent a an equivalence relation ≡a between the call sequences, defined
as follows:
c≡a d iff ca = da.
So according to this definition two call sequences are equivalent for agent a if his views of them are
the same. Below we shall rely on the following result from [2].
Theorem 4 (Equivalence) For each agent a the relations ∼a and ≡a coincide.
5 Semantic matters
5.1 General considerations
We shall need below an alternative definition of truth of the CGφ formulas. Given a sequence a1, . . .,ak
of elements of G we abbreviate Ka1 . . .Kakφ to Ka1. . .akφ . We also denote the set of finite sequences of
elements of G by G∗.
Note 5 ([14]) For all call sequences c and formulas CGφ ∈ L
ck
(M,c) |=CGφ iff for all t ∈G
∗ (M,c) |= Ktφ .
In other words, the formula CGφ is equivalent to the infinite conjunction
∧
t∈G∗ Ktφ . We shall also
need the following generalization of the corresponding result from [2] to the logic here studied.
Theorem 6 (Monotonicity) Suppose that φ ∈Lck is a formula that does not contain the ¬ symbol. Then
c⊑ d and (M,c) |= φ implies (M,d) |= φ .
Proof. By Note 5 and Monotonicity Theorem 4 of [2]. ✷
Let us focus now on the case of ≥ 3 agents. The following result holds.
Theorem 7 Suppose that |G| ≥ 3. Then for all call sequences c and formulas φ ∈ Lck
(M,c) |=CGφ iffM |= φ .
Proof. First we prove that for all c and d
c∼G d. (1)
By the transitivity of ∼G it suffices to prove that c ∼G ε . We prove it by induction on the length of
c. By definition ε ∼G ε . Suppose that for some c we have c∼G ε and consider a call c. Take a ∈ G such
that a 6∈ c (it exists since |G| ≥ 3). Then c.c∼a c, so c.c∼G ε .
By (1) we have (M,c) |=CGφ iff ∀d (M,d) |= φ , which concludes the proof. ✷
Theorem 7 states that the formulas commonly known by the agents in a group of at least three agents
are precisely the true formulas. An example of such a statement is that each agent is familiar with his
secret, i.e.,
∧
a∈AFaA. In contrast, a statement that an agent is familiar with the secret of another agent, i.e.
FaB, where a 6= b, is not always true, so for all call sequences c we have (M,c) 6|=CGFaB, when |G| ≥ 3.
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5.2 The case of two agents
The situation changes when the group consists of two agents. In what follows we abbreviate C{a,b} to
Cab.
Example 8
(i) Consider the formula
φ := ¬FaB∨
∨
c∈A\{a,b}
FcB.
It states that if a is familiar with the secret of b, then also another agent different from a and b is familiar
with this secret. Note that (M,ab) |= ¬φ , i.e., φ is not always true. We claim that (M,ε) |=Cabφ .
First note that if c ∼a d or c ∼b d and the call ab does not appear in c, then it does not appear in d
either. Consequently, if c∼{a,b} ε , then the call ab does not appear in c.
Conversely, take a call sequence c such that the call ab does not appear in it. We prove by induction
on the length of c that c ∼{a,b} ε . By definition ε ∼{a,b} ε . Suppose that for some c we have c ∼{a,b} ε
and consider a call c. Either a 6∈ c or b 6∈ c, so either c.c∼a c or c.c∼b c. Consequently c.c∼{a,b} ε .
We conclude that c∼{a,b} ε iff the call ab does not appear in c. But for any such cwe have (M,c) |= φ .
This proves that (M,ε) |=Cabφ .
This shows that even without any call two agents can commonly know a formula that is not always
true.
(ii) We also have (M,ab) |= Cab(FaB∧FbA), i.e., two agents can commonly know some non-trivial
information about themselves.
Indeed, if the call ab appears in c, then (M,c) |= FaB∧FbA and that if the call ab appears in c and
c∼a d or c∼b d, then it also appears in d. ✷
On the other hand for two agents the following partial analogue of Theorem 7 holds.
Theorem 9 For all call sequences c that do not contain the call ab and all formulas φ ∈ Lck that do not
contain the ¬ symbol
(M,c) |=Cabφ iffM|= φ .
Proof. Suppose (M,c) |=Cabφ . As noticed in Example 8(i) c∼{a,b} ε , so (M,ε) |= φ . By the Monotonic-
ity Theorem 6 for all call sequences dwe have (M,d) |= φ . So |= φ . Further, |= φ implies (M,c) |=Cabφ
for arbitrary call sequences c and formulas Cabφ . ✷
Example 8(ii) shows that the restriction that the call ab does not appear in c cannot be dropped and
Example 8(i) shows that the claim does not hold for formulas that do contain the ¬ symbol.
Next, we show that for formulas that do not contain the ¬ symbol common knowledge for the group
of two agents coincides with the 4th fold iterated knowledge.
Consider an agent a and a call sequence c. We say that a call is a-irrelevant in c if its removal does not
affect the view (in the sense of Section 4) of agent a of the call sequence. Starting from c we repeatedly
remove from the current call sequence the first not yet analyzed call if it is a-irrelevant and otherwise we
keep it. We call the outcome of such an iteration the a-simplification of c.
Example 10 Suppose,
c= b f .cd.bc.ce.d f .e f .bh.a f .bg.ag.ah,
where for the visibility we underlined the a-calls. Then the a-simplification of c results in the deletion of
the calls b f and cd and equals
bc.ce.d f .e f .bh.a f .bg.ag.ah.
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The views of agent a of both call sequences are as follows.
A.B.C.D.E.F.D.H
a f
−→
ABCDEF.B.C.D.E.ABCDEF.G.H
ag
−→
ABCDEFGH.B.C.D.E.ABCDEF.ABCDEFGH.H
ah
−→
ABCDEFGH.B.C.D.E.ABCDEF.ABCDEFGH.ABCDEFGH
✷
Below we say that two calls are linked if exactly one agent participates in both of them. Consider
now a call sequence c with no a-irrelevant calls that does not contain the call ab. We focus on the b-calls
in c. By the assumption about c for each b-call c in c there is a sequence of calls c1, . . .,ck in c such that
• c= c1,
• b ∈ c1,
• for i ∈ {1, . . .,k−1} a 6∈ ci,
• for i ∈ {1, . . .,k−1} the calls ci and ci+1 are linked.
• a ∈ ck.
We say then that c1 leads to ck. Further, we call each b-call in c that leads to the earliest possible
a-call in c b-essential for a and call each other b-call in c b-inessential for a. Intuitively, agent a learns
the secret of b only through the b-essential calls. In contrast, he can learn other secrets both through the
b-essential and the b-inessential calls.
Example 11 Consider the call sequence
bc.ce.d f .e f .bh.a f .bg.ag.ah
from Example 10. The only b-essential call for a is bc as it leads to a f . In turn, in the call sequence
bh.ce.d f .e f .a f .bg.bc.ag the b-essential calls for a are bh and bg as both of them lead to ag and no b-call
leads to the earlier a-call a f . ✷
Consider now the first b-call in c, call it bc, that is b-inessential for a and suppose that ad is the
first a-call in c to which bc leads to, where c and d may coincide. If c = d, then we delete bc from c
and otherwise we replace bc by cd. Intuitively, we ‘reroute’ the information collected by agent b in the
b-inessential calls leading to ad using agent d. This does not affect agent’s a view of the call sequence
since he does not learn the secret of b through the b-inessential calls.
We repeat this operation, starting with c, for all b-calls that are b-inessential for a and denote the
resulting call sequence by Rab(c).
Example 12 Consider the call sequence
bc.ce.d f .e f .bh.a f .bg.ag.ah
from Example 10. The b-inessential calls are bh and bg and both lead to ag. So
Rab(bc.ce.d f .e f .bh.a f .bg.ag.ah) = bc.ce.d f .e f .gh.a f .ag.ah.
✷
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The following lemma establishes the relevant property of Rab(c).
Lemma 13 Consider a call sequence c with no a-irrelevant calls that does not contain the call ab. Then
c≡a Rab(c).
Proof. Since c does not contain the call ab, the views of a of c and Rab(c) have the same sequences of the
a-calls.
By definition agent a does not learn the secret of b through the b-inessential calls for a. So the
replacement (or possibly deletion) of b in all b-inessential calls has no effect on the status of this secret
in the views of a of both sequences.
Let bc be the first b-inessential for a call in c and suppose that ad is the first a-call in c it leads to. Let
c′ be the outcome of the first step of producing Rab(c). So it is obtained from c by replacing bc by cd if
c 6= d, and by deleting bc otherwise. We show that the views of the agent a of the call sequences c and c′
are the same. First, note that no a-call earlier than ad can be effected by the change in c, because ad is
the first a-call bc leads to.
Consider the c 6= d case first. The set of secrets an agent is familiar with at the same point in c and c′
may differ as a result of bc being replaced by cd. However, we argue that it is impossible for the agent
a to notice this difference. Let us consider a call ax in c, where x ∈ A and the sets of secrets, S and S′,
agent e is familiar before ax is made in c and c′, respectively.
• If ax takes place before bc then S and S′ are the same.
• If ax is in-between the calls bc and ad then again the sets S and S′ are the same, because ad is the
first a-call that bc leads to.
• If ax is the call ad then we have the following. First, just before this call a is already familiar with
all the secrets b is familiar with before the call bc is made in c, because ad is the first a-call bc
leads to. So a is still familiar with all these secrets in c′. Thus the only secrets that may be lost
by replacing bc by cd are the ones that c is familiar with at that point. However, these secrets are
passed to d and a still learns them all in c′ through the call ad.
• If ax takes place after the call ad then the difference between S and S′ could be at most in the set
of secrets a learned through the call bc. However, a already knows these secrets after the call ad is
made, so S = S′.1
The reasoning for the c= d case is completely analogous and omitted.
By iterating the above argument, starting with c, we obtain Rab(c) without affecting the view of the
agent a. ✷
The following consequence of the above lemma is crucial. Here ≡abab stands for the the composition
of the relations ≡a, ≡b, ≡a and ≡b, i.e.,
≡abab = ≡a ◦ ≡b ◦ ≡a ◦ ≡b,
where ◦ is the composition of two binary relations.
Theorem 14 Consider a call sequence c that does not contain the call ab. Then
c≡abab ε .
1Note that this crucially depends on the fact that from any call each involved agent learns the union of the sets of secrets the
callers are familiar with and not the set of secrets the other caller is familiar with.
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Proof. Let c1 be the a-simplification of c and c2 = Rab(c1). Then c≡a c1 and by Lemma 13 c1 ≡a c2, so
c≡a c2.
If there are no b-calls in c2, then c2≡b ε , so c≡ab ε , from which the conclusion follows since ε ≡ab ε .
Otherwise let c3 be the prefix of c2 that ends with the last b-call. Then c2 ≡b c3.
All the b-calls in c3 are b-essential for a in the call sequence c2 and the a-call through which agent a
learns in c2 the secret of B is located after all these b-essential calls. It follows that c3 ≡a c4, where c4 is
the result of removing all b-calls from c3, because no b-call in c3 can possibly lead to an a-call in c3.
Now, c4 does not contain any b-calls, so c4 ≡b ε . This proves the claim. ✷
Example 15 The following example illustrates the call sequences generated in the above proof. Let
c= ah.cd.bc.bd.be.ad .b f .bg.a f .
Then the a-simplification of c results in removing the calls cd and bg and equals
c1 = ah.bc.bd.be.ad.b f .a f .
Subsequently Rab(c1) equals
c2 = ah.bc.bd.e f .ad.a f .
Next, the prefix of c2 that ends with the last b-call is
c3 = ah.bc.bd.
Finally, the result of removing all b-calls from c3 equals
c4 = ah
and c4 ≡b ε . ✷
This brings us to the following conclusion.
Theorem 16 For all call sequences c that do not contain the call ab and all formulas φ ∈ Lck that do
not contain the ¬ symbol
(M,c) |= Kababφ iffM|= φ
and
(M,c) |= Kbabaφ iffM|= φ .
Proof. By symmetry it suffices to prove the first equivalence. By Theorem 14 (M,c) |= Kababφ implies
(M,ε) |= φ , so by the Monotonicity Theorem 6 for all call sequences d we have (M,d) |= φ , i.e.,
M |= φ .
Further, for arbitrary call sequences c and formulas φ ∈ Lck,M |= φ implies (M,c) |= Kababφ . ✷
Corollary 17 For all call sequences c that do not contain the call ab and all formulas φ ∈ Lck that do
not contain the ¬ symbol
(M,c) |=Cabφ iff (M,c) |= Kababφ .
Proof. By Theorems 16 and 9. ✷
This together with Note 5 shows that under the conditions of the above corollary the infinite conjunc-
tion
∧
t∈G∗ Ktφ is equivalent to the 4th fold iterated knowledge Kababφ . To conclude this analysis we now
show that common knowledge for two agents is not equivalent to any shorter knowledge iteration.
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Corollary 18 Let c = ac,bc,ac. Then (M,c) |= KabaFcA, (M,c) |= KabFcA and (M,c) |= KaFcA. Fur-
ther, (M,c) 6|=CabFcA.
Proof. Take d such that c ∼a d. Then d is of the form c1,ac,c2,bc, c3,ac,c4. Next take d1 such that
d1 ∼b d. Then d is of the form c5,ac,c6,bc,c7. Next take d2 such that d2 ∼a d1. Then d2 is of the form
c8,ac,c9. So (M,d2) |= FcA, which implies the claim.
The next two claims follow since for all formulas φ ∈ Lck, Kabaφ implies both Kabφ and Kaφ .
Now note that for all sequences t ∈ {a,b}∗ that extend abab or baba and all formulas φ ∈ Lck, Ktφ
implies Kababφ or Kbabaφ . So Theorem 16 implies that for all such sequences s and all call sequences c
that do not contain the call ab
(M,c) 6|= KsFcA.
Indeed, the formula FcA is not always true.
Further, by Note 5 we also have for such call sequences c
(M,c) 6|=CabFcA.
In particular, this holds for the above call sequence c= ac,bc,ac. ✷
6 Decidability issues
6.1 Decidability of semantics
We begin with the decidability of the semantics. First we establish some properties of the semantics of
common knowledge of two agents.
Consider a call ab and a call sequence c. Starting from c we repeatedly remove from the current call
sequence a redundant call that differs from ab. We call each outcome of such an iteration an ab-reduction
of c. Further, we say that a call sequence c is ab-redundant free if no call from c that differs from ab is
redundant in it. Clearly each ab-reduction is ab-redundant free.
Corollary 19 Let d be an ab-reduction of c. Then
(i) c∼{a,b} d,
(ii) for all formulas φ ∈ Lpr, (M,c) |= φ iff (M,d) |= φ .
Lemma 20 For each call ab and a call sequence c the set of ab-redundant free call sequences d such
that c∼{a,b} d is finite.
Proof. Consider an ab-redundant free call sequence d such that c ∼{a,b} d. Then d has the same number,
say k, of calls ab as c.
Associate with d the sequence of gossip situations
d0(root),d1(root), . . . ,dm(root),
where m is the length of d, d0 = ε , and dk = d1,d2, . . . ,dk for k = 1, . . . ,m. This sequence monotonically
grows, where we interpret the inclusion relation componentwise. Moreover, for all calls di different from
ab the corresponding inclusion is strict. Consequently, m, the length of d, is bounded by k+ |A||A|, the
sum of the number of calls ab in c and of the total number of secrets in the gossip situation in which each
agent is an expert.
But for each m there are only finitely many call sequences of length at most m. This concludes the
proof. ✷
We can now prove the desired result.
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Theorem 21 (Decidability of Semantics) For each call sequence c it is decidable whether for a formula
φ ∈ Lwn, (M,c) |= φ holds.
Proof. We use the definition of semantics as the algorithm. We only need to consider the case of the
formulas of the form CGφ , where φ ∈ Lpr.
If |G|= 1, then this is the contents of the Decidability of Semantics Theorem 5 of [2].
If |G| = 2, say A = {a,b}, then according to Corollary 19 we can rewrite the semantics of CGφ as
follows:
(M,c) |=CGφ iff ∀d s.t. c∼G d and d is ab-redundant free, (M,d) |= φ ,
and according to Lemma 20 this definition refers to a finite set of call sequences d.
If |G| ≥ 3, then the decidability follows from Theorem 7 and the Decidability of Truth Theorem 6
established in [2]. ✷
This result implies that the gossip protocols that use guards with non-nested common knowledge
operator are implementable.
6.2 Decidability of truth
Next, we show that truth definition for the formulas of the language Lwn is decidable. Since partial
correctness of gossip protocols with common knowledge operator can be expressed as a formula of Lwn,
this implies that the problem of determining partial correctness of such protocols is decidable.
The key notion is that of an epistemic pair-view. It is a function of a call sequence c, denoted by
EPV(c), defined by
• putting for any pair of agents a,b:
EPV(c)(a,b) = {d(root) | c∼{a,b} d}, and setting
• EPV(c)(∗) = c(root).
So EPV(c)(a,b) is the set of all gossip situations obtained by means of call sequences that are ∼{a,b}–
equivalent to c. Further, as ∼{a,a}=∼a, EPV(c)(a,a) is the set of all gossip situations consistent with
agent a’s observations made throughout c. Finally, EPV(c)(∗) is the actual gossip situation after c takes
place. Note that for any a,b ∈ A, if c ∼{a,b} d then EPV(c)(b,a) = EPV(c)(a,b) = EPV(d)(a,b) =
EPV(d)(b,a).
The following holds.
Lemma 22 For each call sequence c and agents a,b, the set EPV(c)(a,b) is finite and can be effectively
constructed.
Proof. For any a∈ A, EPV(c)(a,a) coincides with the epistemic view EV(c)(a), as defined in [2]. Hence,
we can compute EPV(c)(a,a) as in Lemma 3 of [2].
Consider now a pair of agents a,b such that a 6= b. To construct the set EPV(c)(a,b) it suffices by
Corollary 19 to consider the ab-redundant free call sequences d and by Lemma 20 there are only finitely
many such call sequences d for which d∼{a,b} c. ✷
Our interest in epistemic pair-views stems from the following important observation.
Lemma 23 Suppose that EPV(c) = EPV(d). Then for all formulas φ ∈Lwn, (M,c) |= φ iff (M,d) |= φ .
Proof.A straightforward proof by induction shows that for a formula ψ ∈Lpr and arbitrary call sequences
c′ and d′,
c′(root) = d′(root) implies that (M,c′) |= ψ iff (M,d′) |= ψ . (2)
K. R. Apt & D. Wojtczak 21
Since EPV(c)(∗) = c(root) and EPV(d)(∗) = d(root), this settles the case for φ = Fap.
Next, consider the case of the formulas of the form CGφ , where φ ∈ Lwn.
If |G|= 1, then G= {a} for some a ∈ A and CG is the same as Ka. Since EPV(c) = EPV(d) implies
EV(c) = EV(d), where the epistemic view EV() is defined as in [2], the claim follows by Lemma 4 of
[2].
If |G|= 2, then G= {a,b} for some a,b ∈ A. By (2) and the definition of EPV(c)
(M,c) |=CGφ iff ∀c
′ s.t. c′(root) ∈ EPV(c)(a,b), (M,c′) |= φ .
So the claim follows since EPV(c)(a,b) = EPV(d)(a,b).
If |G| ≥ 3, then by Theorem 7 both (M,c′) |=CGφ and (M,d
′) |=CGφ are equivalent to |= φ .
This settles the case forCGφ . The remaining cases of negation and conjunction follow directly by the
induction. ✷
The above lemma is useful because the epistemic pair-view of each call sequence is finite, in contrast
to the set of call sequences. Next, we provide an inductive definition of EPV(c.c)(a,b) the importance
of which will become clear in a moment.
Lemma 24 For any call sequence c and call c= ab for agents a,b ∈ A
EPV(c.c)(a,b) = {c(s) | s ∈ EPV(c)(a,b),c(s)a = c(c(root))a and c(s)b = c(c(root))b}.
Proof.
(⊆ ) Take s′ ∈ EPV(c.c)(a,b). By the definition of EPV(c.c)(a,b) there exists a call sequence d such
that d.c∼{a,b} c.c and s
′ = d.c(root). So s′ = c(s), where s= d(root). We prove now that d∼{a,b} c and
as a result s= d(root) ∈ EPV(c)(a,b).
Note that d.c ∼{a,b} c.c implies that there exists a sequence t1 . . . tk ∈ {a,b}
∗ such that for some call
sequences d1,d2, . . . ,dk−1 we have d.c ∼t1 d1.c ∼t2 d2.c ∼t3 . . . ∼tk−1 dk−1.c ∼tk c.c. Note that for any
t ∈ {a,b} and call sequences c′,d′ we have that c′.c ∼t d
′
.c implies c′ ∼t d
′, because ∼t is the minimal
relation satisfying the conditions stated in Definition 1. It follows that d∼t1 d1∼t2 d2∼t3 . . .∼tk−1 dk−1∼tk
c, so by definition d∼{a,b} c.
Further, by the definition of the∼c relations, we also have that for i∈ {0, . . .,k−1} both di.c(root)a=
di+1.c(root)a and di.c(root)b = di+1.c(root)b, where d0 = d and dk = c. So d.c(root)a = c.c(root)a and
d.c(root)b = c.c(root)b.
But s= d(root), so we get that c(s)a = c(c(root))a and c(s)b = c(c(root))b.
(⊇) Take s′ ∈ {c(s) | s ∈ EPV(c)(a,b),c(s)a = c(c(root))a and c(s)b = c(c(root))b}. So for some gossip
situation s we have s′ = c(s), s ∈ EPV(c)(a,b), c(s)a = c(c(root))a, and c(s)b = c(c(root))b. The fact
that s∈ EPV(c)(a,b) implies that there exists a call sequence d such that d∼{a,b} c and s= d(root). Now,
this and c(d(root))a = c(s)a = c(c(root))a imply by definition that d.c∼a c.c, so a fortiori d.c∼{a,b} c.c.
So d.c(root) ∈ EPV(c.c)(a,b). Consequently also s′ ∈ EPV(c.c)(a,b), because s′ = c(s) = d.c(root). ✷
This allows us to conclude that EPV(c.c) can be computed using EPV(c) and c only, i.e., without
referring to c. More precisely, denote the set of epistemic pair-views by E˜PV and recall that C denotes
the set of calls. Then the following holds.
Corollary 25 There exists a function f : E˜PV ×C→ E˜PV such that for any call sequence c, call c, and
pair of agents a,b ∈ A
EPV(c.c)(a,b) = f (EPV(c),c).
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Proof. First note that EPV(c.c)(∗) = c(EPV(c)(∗)).
Suppose now that a 6= b. If c= ab, then by Lemma 24 EPV(c.c)(a,b) is a function of EPV(c)(a,b)
and c. If c 6= ab, say a 6∈ c, then c.c ∼a c and hence c.c ∼{a,b} c, which implies EPV(c.c)(a,b) =
EPV(c)(a,b).
Suppose next that a = b. By the definition of ∼a for all d we have EPV(d)(a,a) = EV(d)(a), so by
Corollary 2 of [2] EPV(c.c)(a,a) is a function of EPV(c)(a,a) and c. ✷
Consider a call sequence c. If for some prefix c1.c2 of c, we have EPV(c1) = EPV(c1.c2), then we
say that the call subsequence c2 is pair-epistemically redundant in c and that c is pair-epistemically
redundant.
We say that c is pair-epistemically non-redundant if it is not pair-epistemically redundant. Equiva-
lently, a call sequence c1.c2 . . . . .ck is pair-epistemically non-redundant if the set
{EPV(c1.c2. . . . .ci) | i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}}
has k elements.
Lemma 26 (Pair-Epistemic Stuttering) Suppose that c := c1.c2.c3 and d := c1.c3, where c2 is pair-
epistemically redundant in c. Then EPV(c) = EPV(d).
Proof. Let c3 = c1.c2. . . . .ck. First note that thanks to Corollary 2 of [2] we have EPV(c1.c2.c1) =
EPV(c1.c1), since EPV(c1.c2.c1) = f (EPV(c1.c2),c1) = f (EPV(c1),c1) = EPV(c1.c1) due to the pair-
epistemic redundancy of c2 in c. Repeating this argument for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} we get that
EPV(c1.c2.c1.c2. . . . .ci) = EPV(c1.c1.c2. . . . .ci).
In particular EPV(c) = EPV(d). ✷
Corollary 27 For every call sequence c there exists a pair-epistemically non-redundant call sequence d
such that for all formulas φ ∈ Lwn, (M,c) |= φ iff (M,d) |= φ .
Proof. By the repeated use of the Pair-Epistemic Stuttering Lemma 26 and Lemma 23. ✷
Next, we prove the following crucial lemma.
Lemma 28 For any given modelM, there are only finitely many pair-epistemically non-redundant call
sequences.
Proof. Note that each epistemic pair-view is a function from A×A∪{∗} to the set of functions from A to
2|P| (this is an overestimation because for ∗ this set has only one element). There are k = 2(|A|
2+1)·2|A|·|P|
such functions, so any call sequence longer than k has a pair-epistemically redundant call subsequence.
But there are only finitely many call sequences of length at most k. This concludes the proof. ✷
Finally, we can establish the announced result.
Theorem 29 (Decidability of Truth) For any formula φ ∈ Lwn, it is decidable whetherM|= φ holds.
Proof. Recall thatM|= φ iff ∀c (M,c) |= φ . By Corollary 27 we can rewrite the latter as
∀c s.t. c is pair-epistemically non-redundant, (M,c) |= φ .
But according to Lemma 28 there are only finitely many pair-epistemically non-redundant call sequences
and by Lemma 23 their set can be explicitly constructed. ✷
K. R. Apt & D. Wojtczak 23
6.3 Decidability of termination with common knowledge operator
Finally, we show that it is decidable to determine whether a gossip protocol that uses guard with non-
nested common knowledge operator (in short: a common knowledge protocol) terminates. For an exam-
ple of such a protocol see Appendix A.
First, we establish monotonicity of gossip situations and epistemic pair-views with respect to call
sequence extensions, w.r.t. suitable partial orderings. Intuitively, we claim that as the call sequence gets
longer each agent acquires more information.
Definition 30 For any two gossip situations s,s′ we write s≤A s
′ if for all a ∈ A we have sa ⊆ s
′
a.
Note 31 (Note 1 of [2]) For all call sequences c and d such that c⊑ d we have c(root)≤A d(root).
Definition 32 For any two epistemic pair-views V,V ′ ∈ E˜PV we write V ≤EPV V
′ if for all a,b ∈ A there
exists X ⊆ V (a,b) and an surjective (onto) function g : X → V ′(a,b) such that for all s ∈ X we have
s≤A g(s).
Lemma 33 ≤EPV is a partial order.
Proof.
(Reflexivity) For any epistemic pair-view V , we have V ≤EPV V , because for each a,b ∈ A we can pick
V (a,b) as X and the identity function on V (a,b) as g.
(Transitivity) Suppose V,V ′,V ′′ are three epistemic pair-views such that V ≤EPV V
′ and V ′ ≤EPV V
′′.
Then, from the definition of ≤EPV, for any a,b ∈ A there exist X ⊆V (a,b), Y ⊆V
′(a,b), and surjective
functions g : X→V ′(a,b) and h :Y →V ′′(a,b). Let Z = {s ∈ X | g(s)∈Y}. Note that g|Z : Z→Y , i.e. the
restriction of g to Z, is surjective. The composition g|Z ◦h : Z→ V
′′(a,b) is also surjective and for any
gossip situation s ∈ Z the following holds s≤A g|Z(s)≤A h(g|Z(s)) = (g|Z ◦h)(s).
(Antisymmetry) Suppose V,V ′ are two epistemic pair-views such that V ≤EPV V
′ and V ′ ≤EPV V . Then,
from the definition of ≤EPV, for any a,b ∈ A there exist X ⊆ V (a,b), Y ⊆V
′(a,b), and surjective func-
tions g :X→V ′(a,b) and h :Y →V (a,b). Let Z= {s∈X | g(s)∈Y}. Note that g|Z : Z→Y , i.e. the restric-
tion of g to Z, is surjective. Moreover, g|Z ◦h : Z→V (a,b) is also surjective, and because Z ⊆V (a,b) is
finite, Z =V (a,b), g|Z = g, and g◦h is a permutation onV (a,b). Similarly we can show that Y =V
′(a,b).
Since (g◦h) is a permutation on a finite set, there exists k such that (g◦h)k is the identity function on
V (a,b).
Note that for any s ∈V (a,b), we have s≤A (g◦h)(s), because s≤A g(s)≤A h(g(s))). Now consider
the sequence: s≤A (g◦h)(s) ≤A (g◦h)
2(s)≤A . . . ≤A (g◦h)
k(s) = s. In fact, all of the elements in this
sequence have to be the same, because ≤A is a partial order. In particular, this shows that (g◦h)(s) = s.
Therefore, g◦h is the identity function on V (a,b). Now, for any s ∈V (a,b) we have that s ≤A g(s) ≤A
h(g(s)) = (g◦h)(s) = s, so g is the identity function as well. This shows that V (a,b) = V ′(a,b) for all
a,b ∈ A. ✷
The next lemma formalizes the intuition that information captured by the epistemic pair-view grows
along a call sequence.
Lemma 34 For all two call sequences such that c⊑ d we have EPV(c)≤EPV EPV(d).
Proof. Let d = c.c′. Take a,b ∈ A. By a repeated application of Lemma 24 we get EPV(c.c′)(a,b) =
{c′(s) | s ∈ EPV(c)(a,b) and ∀c′′ ⊑ c′ (c′′(s)a = c
′′(c(root))a∧ c
′′(s)b = c
′′(c(root))b)}. It suffices then
to pick X = {s∈ EPV(c)(a,b) | ∀c′′ ⊑ c′ (c′′(s)a = c
′′(c(root))a∧c
′′(s)b = c
′′(c(root))b)} and set g(s) =
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c′(s) for all s ∈ X . It is easy to check that such g : X → EPV(d) is surjective, so EPV(c)≤EPV EPV(d),
as claimed. ✷
We can now draw the following useful conclusion.
Lemma 35 Suppose that c is pair-epistemically redundant. Then a prefix c1.c of it exists such that c1 is
pair-epistemically non-redundant and EPV(c1.c) = EPV(c1).
Proof. Let c1.c2 be the shortest prefix of c such that EPV(c1) = EPV(c1.c2). Then c1 is pair-epistemically
non-redundant. Let c2 = c1. . . . .cl . By Lemma 34 we have
EPV(c1)≤EPV EPV(c1.c1)≤EPV EPV(c1.c1.c2)≤EPV . . .≤EPV
EPV(c1.c1.c2. . . . .cl) = EPV(c1.c2) = EPV(c1).
Since ≤EPV is a partial order, EPV(c1.c1) = EPV(c1) holds. ✷
Finally we can establish the desired result. In the proof we shall use the following observation.
Theorem 36 (Stuttering) Suppose that c := c1.c.c2 and d := c1.c.c.c2. Then for all formulas φ ∈ L
ck,
(M,c) |= φ iff (M,d) |= φ .
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the corresponding Stuttering Theorem 3 from [2] and Note 5. ✷
Theorem 37 (Decidability of Termination) Given a common knowledge gossip protocol it is decidable
to determine whether it always terminates.
Proof. We first prove that a gossip protocol may fail to terminate iff it can generate a call sequence c.c
such that c is pair-epistemically non-redundant and EPV(c.c) = EPV(c).
(⇒ ) Let c be an infinite sequence of calls generated by the protocol. There are only finitely many pair-
epistemic views, so some prefix c of c is pair-epistemically redundant. The claim now follows by Lemma
35.
(⇐ ) Suppose that the protocol generates a sequence of calls c.c such that c is pair-epistemically non-
redundant and EPV(c.c) = EPV(c).
Let φ be the guard associated with the call c, i.e., φ → c is a rule used in the considered protocol. By
assumption (M,c) |= φ , so by Lemma 23 (M,c.c) |= φ . By the repeated application of the Stuttering
Theorem 36 we get that for all i ≥ 1, (M,c.ci) |= φ . Consequently, c.cω is an infinite sequence of calls
that can be generated by the protocol.
The above equivalence shows that determining whether the protocol always terminates is equivalent
to checking that it cannot generate a call sequence c.c such that c is pair-epistemically non-redundant
and EPV(c.c) = EPV(c).
But given a call sequence, by the Decidability of Semantics Theorem 21, it is decidable to determine
whether it can be generated by the protocol and by Lemma 22 it is decidable to determine whether a
call sequence is pair-epistemically non-redundant. Further, by Lemma 28 there are only finitely many
pair-epistemically non-redundant call sequences, so the claim follows. ✷
7 Conclusions
We studied here various aspects of common knowledge in the context of a natural epistemic logic used
to express and reason about distributed epistemic gossip protocols. We showed that the semantics and
truth in this logic are decidable in the absence of nested modalities. The first result implies that the gossip
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protocols relying on such a use of the common knowledge operator are implementable and the second
one that their partial correctness is decidable, since partial correctness of these gossip protocols can be
expressed as a formula of the considered language. Further, we proved that the termination of these
gossip protocols is decidable, as well.
There are a number of interesting open problems related to this work. An obvious question is whether
our results can be extended to formulas that admit nested modalities.
In Corollary 17 we showed that under certain conditions common knowledge for two agents is equiv-
alent to the 4th fold iterated knowledge. An intriguing question is whether this result holds for arbitrary
call sequences and arbitrary formulas. If not, is then common knowledge always equivalent to some finite
iterated knowledge?
Finally, it would be interesting to clarify which formulas two agents can commonly know, i.e., given
a call sequence c to characterize the formulas φ for which (M,c) |= Cabφ holds. Example 8 indicates
that this problem is non-trivial even without any call being performed.
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A Example: a common knowledge protocol
To illustrate gossip protocols that employ the common knowledge operator assume that the agents are
nodes of an undirected connected graph (V,E) and that the calls can take place only between pairs of
agents connected by an edge. Let Ni denote the set of neighbours of node i.
Consider a gossip protocol with the following program for agent i (we use here the syntax introduced
in [1]):
∗[[] j∈Ni ,B∈PFiB∧¬Ci jFjB→ (i, j)].
Informally, agent i calls a neighbour j if i is familiar with some secret (here B) and there is no
common knowledge between i and j that j is familiar with this secret.
Partial correctness of a protocol states that upon its termination the formula
∧
i, j∈AFiJ holds.
To prove partial correctness of the above protocol consider the exit condition∧
(i, j)∈E
∧
B∈P
(FiB→Ci jFjB).
K. R. Apt & D. Wojtczak 27
For all agents i and j and secrets B, the formula Ci jFjB→ FjB is true, so the exit condition implies∧
(i, j)∈E
∧
B∈P
(FiB→ FjB).
Consider now an agent i and the secret J of agent j. Let j = i1, . . ., ih = i be a path that connects j
with i. The above formula implies that for g ∈ {1, . . .,h−1} we have
∧
B∈P(FigB→ Fig+1B). By combin-
ing these h− 1 formulas we get
∧
B∈P(FjB→ FiB). But FjJ is true, so we conclude FiJ. Consequently∧
i, j∈AFiJ, as desired.
To prove termination we need the following observation.
Lemma 38 For all call sequences c.(i, j) and secrets B
(M,c.(i, j)) |= FiB∧FjB implies (M,c.(i, j)) |=Ci j(FiB∧FjB).
Proof. Suppose that (M,c.(i, j)) |= FiB∧FjB. Take some d such that c.(i, j) ∼{i, j} d. So there exists a
sequence of call sequences c1, . . .,ck such that
c.(i, j) = c1 ∼m1 c2 ∼m2 . . .∼mk ck = d,
where each mh is i or j.
By the repeated use of the Equivalence Theorem 4 each of the call sequences c1, . . .,ck contains the
call (i, j) that corresponds with the last call of c.(i, j). Let d1.(i, j), . . .,dk.(i, j) be the corresponding
prefixes of c1, . . .,ck.
By the Equivalence Theorem 4 and the definition of a view given there we also have
d1.(i, j)i = d1.(i, j) j = d2.(i, j)i = d2.(i, j) j.
By the assumption this implies (M,d2.(i, j)) |= FiB∧FjB, since d1.(i, j) = c.(i, j).
Repeating this procedure we conclude that (M,dk.(i, j)) |= FiB∧FjB and hence (M,d) |= FiB∧FjB.
This implies the claim. ✷
Now, by the definition of semantics for all call sequences c.(i, j) and secrets B, (M,c) |= FiB im-
plies (M,c.(i, j)) |= FiB∧ FjB, which implies by Lemma 38 that (M,c.(i, j)) |= Ci j(FiB∧ FjB) and
hence (M,c.(i, j)) |=Ci jFjB. This shows that after each call (i, j) the size of the set {(i, j,B) | ¬Ci jFjB}
decreases.
